Schneider's work on rank functions [17] 
Introduction
Security protocols can be insecure even under the assumption of perfect cryptographic mechanisms, because of the possibility of unexpected interactions between the agents involved and potentially hostile intruders. Formal approaches to verification of such protocols have focused either on attempting to find attacks, or else on direct proofs that attacks cannot occur. Attack-oriented approaches model protocols and intruder capabilities in terms of rules which transform messages, and analyse a system for possible attacks through a combination of algebraic reductions on messages and model-checking for reachability (see [9, 11, 12, 10] among others). To keep the state space manageable, these approaches generally require analysis of a restricted model of the system, together with some justification for generalising the results to larger communication networks.
The complementary approach attempts to verify protocols directly, rather than in terms of the absence of attacks.
BAN logics [1] provide one such approach, in which protocols are 'idealised' into statements within the logic. Alternatively, protocols might be modelled within a formal framework and then properties proven directly within that framework [14, 20, 19, 17] . Theorem proving approaches tend to be more time-consuming in establishing correctness, though there are techniques for automating aspects of the analysis, based on the formal models.
The approach taken in [17] is to use the process algebra Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) to model protocols in a hostile environment, and to express security properties as specifications on CSP processes. Verification proceeds by the discovery of a rank function, a function that assigns a value to all possible messages within the system, which is essentially used as an invariant on the messages that can circulate. However, in practice, the construction of a rank function with all the required properties is intricate and difficult to do by hand. This paper presents a decision procedure which either permits the automatic construction of a rank function, or demonstrates that no rank function exists.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the existing approach to using rank functions with CSP for protocol analysis; Section 3 presents the main results of the paper, which are concerned with handling the unbounded nature of the network by identifying a finite number of equivalence classes, and then with providing a procedure for constructing a rank function if one exists. Section 4 briefly discusses the issue of completeness of the rank function approach, a question which remains open in the general case of a large network. The paper finishes with some concluding remarks.
For further information on cutting-edge techniques in security protocol analysis, see [16] .
The network
The network considered in [17] consists of two honest agents A and B, and one dishonest enemy. The behaviours of agents A and B are described as CSP processes ÍË Ê A and ÍË Ê B respectively. These user processes will vary according to the protocol under consideration; they will consist of communication along channels trans, representing transmission of a message, and rec, representing reception. An example is given in Section 2.5.
We shall write 'Í' for the set of user identities on the network, and 'AE ' for the set of nonces that can be used in protocol runs.
The enemy is described by a CSP process which effectively operates as a communications centre for the entire network, in the style of the Dolev-Yao model [3] . All users communicate via the enemy, who maȳ pass messages on normally (but take note of the contents of the message in the process); intercept messages and fail to deliver them; construct and deliver spurious messages purporting to come from anyone he pleases.
In this last case, he may send any message that he has already seen in the network or which he can produce using only messages which he has seen. For instance, if he has observed N A and N B as separate messages, then he may construct N A N A from them and deliver this concatenation. (This concatenation operator is defined to be associative.) We define a 'generates' relation , writing 'S m' to denote that the enemy may construct message m if he possesses every message in the set S. If m and n are messages, k is a key, and k ½ is the inverse of k, then is the smallest relation that satisfies 
The enemy (already in possession of a set of messages S) is then described by the recursive definition:
Here the enemy can either receive any message m transmitted by any agent i to any other agent j along a trans channel, and then act as the enemy with that additional message; or pass any message m that he can generate from S to any agent i along its rec channel, remaining with the same information S. The whole network is then
where ' ' represents independent concurrent execution, and ' ' represents synchronised communication. It can also have an explicit interface:
R requires synchronisation of its arguments on the set R. For any given protocol, there will be a (possibly infinite) set of all atoms that could ever appear in a message of the protocol. This set will encompass all the user identities, nonces and keys, and any other types of atom used in the protocol (for instance, timestamps). From this set we can construct the message space, usually denoted by 'Å', which is the space of all messages which can be generated from these atoms.
We use 'INIT' to denote the set of atoms known to the enemy right from the start. Some users will be under the control of the enemy, and hence their secret keys and all nonces that they might produce will be in INIT; other users will be free of enemy control, and so their secret keys and nonces will not be in INIT.
Authentication
For an authentication protocol to be correct, we usually require that a user B should not finish running the protocol believing that he has been running with a user A unless A also believes that he has been running the protocol with B. (For a discussion of different forms of authentication, see [17] .) Conditions such as this can easily be expressed as trace specifications on NET, requiring that no event from a set T has occurred unless another event from a set R has previously occurred. A trace of a process is a record of the sequence of events it performs during an execution. Then P sat S if all of the traces associated with P satisfy the predicate S. Definition 2.1. For sets R T ¾ Å, we define the trace specification R precedes T as P sat R precedes T¸ tr ¾ traces´Pµ¯´tr R µ tr T µ and note that, since all processes are prefix-closed, this guarantees that any occurrence of t ¾ T in a trace will be preceded by an occurrence of some r ¾ R.
Rank functions Definition 2.2.
A rank function, as defined in [17] , is a function Å from this message space to the set of integers. In addition, we define
If a rank function is understood, we shall just write 'Å ' or 'Å · '. In addition, we shall lift to events concerned with the communication of messages along channels in the obvious way: ´c mµ ´mµ.
The point of a rank function will be to partition the message space into those messages that the enemy might be able to get hold of, and those messages that will certainly remain forever out of his grasp. Anything with positive rank will be something that the enemy might get his hands on; anything of non-positive rank will always be unavailable to him.
Our approach will be to construct our message space so that authentication will correspond to certain messages being kept secret from the enemy. We shall be looking to find a rank function which correctly assigns a positive rank to everything that the enemy may acquire, but which still manages to give a non-positive rank to the messages corresponding to our notion of authentication.
In addition, we shall have cause to ensure that our rank function allows for any sleight of hand that the enemy may wish to perform. This, in particular, means that we must assign positive rank to anything that the enemy:
can construct from what he already has; can persuade an agent to transmit on the network by feeding him with messages already in his possession; has in his possession from the start.
The central theorem from [17]
For a process P to maintain the rank with respect to a rank function , we mean that it will never transmit any message m with ´mµ ¼ unless it has previously received a message m ¼ with ´m ¼ µ ¼. Essentially, this means that the process will never give out anything secret unless it has already received a secret message. 
The proof is omitted; the interested reader is advised to consult [17] .
Example
Consider the three message version of Lowe's fixed version [10] A proof that this rank function satisfies the required conditions is given in [17] . The rank functions theorem now assures us that we have NET sat R precedes T; that is, that B cannot finish the protocol believing that he is communicating with A unless A starts the protocol with B.
Developments
In this section, we present new results that build on Schneider's theory in various ways, constructing from it a vastly more powerful and practical method of analysing security protocols.
Restricting the rank function to ¼ ½
As may be seen from the statement of the theorem, the rank function is in fact used only to partition the message space. The actual value of ´mµ for any given m will not be of interest-we shall care only whether ´mµ ¼ or ´mµ ¼.
Because We also wish to include the possibility of a trusted server participating in the protocol. The process SERVER that will describe the actions of this server will need to maintain the rank as well as the processes controlling the honest agents; we shall need to add a condition to this effect. 
In the event that no server is involved in a protocol, then we shall have that SERVER STOP; in which case this last condition will hold trivially.
Thus existence of a rank function on ¼ ½ is a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of a rank function on . We may concentrate only on binary rank functions, assured that establishing existence or otherwise with this restricted codomain will carry over to .
Multiple concurrent runs
It is not inconceivable that there would be attacks that rely on there being more than two honest agents present, or on one or more agents engaging in more than one run of the protocol. These runs will not necessarily follow on one after the other; they may be run concurrently. We must, therefore, refine our model to allow for an arbitrary number of users each taking part in an arbitrary number of concurrent runs of the protocol, as initiator or responder, and communicating with any other agents they may choose.
All we insist on is that the honest agents must act in accordance with the rules of the protocol. Anything that constitutes a valid attempt to run the protocol as the designer intended will be allowed; but even in our fully general model, only the intruder will be allowed complete freedom of expression.
Our formal assumptions about protocols covered in this thesis are listed below.
Assumption 3.2.
The sequence of messages passed in a protocol run is determined entirely by the identities of the agents involved and the choices of nonces, timestamps and session keys that the agents and server make. The protocol is essentially a template containing free variables representing the initiator's identity, the responder's identity and any nonces, timestamps and session keys.
Implicit in this is that when an agent receives a new nonce, he must be willing to accept any value for the nonce. He may not, for instance, check that the other party's nonce (if any) differs from his nonce (if any), or keep a history of nonces that he has seen and check that an incoming nonce is one that he has not seen before. Assumption 3.2 is slightly stronger than it need be, but formulating it in this way makes the exposition easier to follow. We could partition nonces into two different types, initiator nonces and responder nonces, thus preventing an agent from receiving his own nonce back from the other party in place of a fresh nonce.
Assumption 3.3.
The protocol is intended to involve only two agents-the initiator and the responder-and possibly a trusted server.
Again, this assumption is not strictly necessary, but has been included to clarify the method. The work in this paper could be extended to cover protocols with any fixed, finite number of participants. Assumption 3.4. An agent will never accept a value of one type when he is expecting a value of a different type. Even when he cannot decrypt the message he is receiving, he will still refuse it if the message does not have the exact form that he is expecting it to have. Assumption 3.4 seems particularly unreasonable in the case of messages that the receiver cannot understand. How can he be expected to check the types of the values inside the encryption if he cannot decrypt it? However, Lowe and the two authors of this paper have demonstrated in [6] that a simple method of tagging each field with its intended type cheaply prevents an intruder from taking advantage of any type manipulation. The paper proves that any proof of correctness that relies on Assumption 3.4 will still hold true when the assumption is dropped, provided that the type tagging scheme is used in the implementation.
The old model
In the model presented in [17] , the two agents A and B run together in parallel with the enemy. The users' alphabets are pairwise disjoint, so they are in fact interleaved; and then this large process is joined in parallel with the enemy:
The new players
Let us suppose that we have an infinite 1 set Í of all users, and that for each user U ¾ Í we have an infinite set of nonces AE I U that U may use when acting as initiator (but he will choose each nonce at most once); and an infinite set of nonces AE R U that he will use (again, at most once each) when playing responder. All these nonce sets are disjoint.
(Depending on which protocol we are considering, we may find that an agent does not need to choose a nonce when acting as initiator, or possibly when acting as responder. This will not affect the analysis: AE I or AE R will be used in this case as an indexing set to produce an infinite interleaving of identical components. If a protocol requires the initiator or the responder to choose more than one nonce, then the model will have to be altered; but the alterations will be trivial and will not affect the essence of the discussion that follows.)
How will a general user U act? He may act as many times as he wishes-once for each nonce in AE As we shall see, although we look for a secure run specifically in the case that A initiates a run with B, the behaviours of A and B are no different from the behaviour of the other agents: the above description covers A and B. Thus, our entire network of users will be simply
The new server
The server may possibly want an infinite set AE S of nonces with which to play. Again, providing such a set cannot cause any problem: we shall in any case need an infinite set for the indexed parallel operator so as to ensure that we allow for arbitrarily many server operations. (We could, if no nonces are needed, use ; but AE S will work just as well.)
Suppose that we have some CSP process SERV´nsµ that describes how the trusted server should act when using server nonce ns (if appropriate). We then define
SERVER ns¾AES SERV´nsµ
If the server is not required to generate a nonce, then SERV´nsµ will be independent of ns; if no server is required at all, then SERV´nsµ STOP and so also SERVER STOP.
The new network
Our new network is, therefore,
Analysing the new network
But how are we to analyse this large network? How can we hope to find a rank function , and then show that each user or server process, suitably restricted, maintains the rank?
Let us consider the case of the following protocol, suggested by Ryan:
In this protocol, each key SH´s uµ is a symmetric key shared between the server and user u. Only the agent acting as responder needs to choose a nonce, and we are hoping to authenticate the initiator. (The analysis would not be more difficult if the initiator also chose a nonce, but it would be longer and somewhat repetitive.) Since all the users are identical, we may simply check for correct authentication in a particular run of the protocol involving A and B, and a particular nonce N B ¾ AE R B . If authentication cannot be faked in this run, then (since this run is arbitrarily chosen) it cannot be faked in any run.
We are required to check, therefore, that NET sat R precedes T for suitable R and T. We want to know that if B completes the protocol as responder using nonce N B then A really did attempt to initiate the protocol with B. Thus, following [17] , we might set
R
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so that B cannot receive the appropriate fourth message of the protocol unless A has sent out the first message. However, we take this opportunity to improve on the model somewhat. To make the coding less protocol-specific (and hence easier to modify for analysing other protocols), we introduce pseudo-messages Ò Ø Ó U J at the start of the protocol and Ö ×Ô ÓÒ J U NJ at the end. The former will be sent to indicate that user U has attempted to initiate a protocol run with J; and the latter to inform us that J has successfully completed the protocol as responder, using nonce N J , and (as far as he is aware) with U as initiator-and it will be noted that the form of these messages will not need to change if the protocol changes. Now, as long as we ensure that our initiator process U to include all these pseudo-messages. In addition, the enemy must never be allowed to generate this pseudomessage-but this is automatic, since for every message m in T we have ´mµ ¼ .
(The form of the pseudo-messages given above will not provide any guarantee that runs of A initiating with B are in one-to-one correspondence with runs of B responding to A; a rank function proof would here show simply that if B finishes the protocol as responder, believing that he was talking to A, then A has started the protocol with B at least once in the past. To allow for checking of one-to-one correspondence, we would need to establish that A had started a protocol run during which he believed that the nonce in use was N B . Changing the form of the initgo messages to the form Ò Ø Ó U J N and setting R ØÖ Ò× Ò Ø Ó AE would be the easiest way to achieve this.) The appropriate method is not to rush straight in looking for a rank function. We can drastically reduce the size of the components on which we need to find a rank function by some careful CSP manipulation. We first note that if we define In the case that J A, the above proposition holds trivially. Agent B will never communicate with agent A using nonce N B , and so will never engage in the event 
P i maintains
For if the whole interleaving does not maintain the rank, it must be sending out something of rank zero without having accepted anything of rank zero. This must be because some component P j of the interleaving has sent out something of rank zero; and if the entire interleaving has not taken in anything of rank zero, then nor has P j ; and so P j does not maintain the rank either. Thus, we may unpack the interleaved components and check that they individually maintain the rank. We check that
SERVER
all maintain the rank. But these first three, and the last, are all interleavings that can be further split; so, in fact, we need check only that the following processes maintain the rank: It should be noted exactly what we have achieved here. We have reduced the somewhat tricky problem of verifying a protocol running on an arbitrarily large network with multiple concurrent runs to the problem of verifying the protocol on a system with only a small number of runs. For to find a rank function suitable to prove correctness on the unbounded network, we now need to find a rank function only for the network where each of the four processes listed above engages in at most one run. This is a significant reduction; but we still, so far, have an arbitrary number of users and nonces to deal with.
For consideration of Ryan's Protocol, these four smaller processes may be defined as in Figures 1, 2 and 3 . Finding a rank function such that each of these processes maintains would provide a proof that Ryan's Protocol correctly authenticates the initiator of the protocol. The interested reader should consult [5] for details of how the RankAnalyser program can be used to do this automatically.
The minimal 1-set rank function ¼
We have not yet tackled the issue of exactly how to find a rank function when we have decided on the message space and user processes. We need to partition the message space somehow; but since we are looking for a rank function rather than the rank function, we have some latitude in how to proceed with the search. One might be forgiven for thinking that this looks like more of an art than a science! In addition, a fruitless trial-and-error search for a rank function can never provide convincing evidence that no rank function exists (unless, of course, the search helps us to find an attack on the protocol). We might form a strong suspicion-but no more-that there is none to be found.
Let us define the function ¼ (informally at first) to be the function that gives a rank of one to everything that must have rank one, and zero to everything else. For we recall that to be a suitable rank function we require that anything generable from messages of rank one should also have rank one; The first three conditions provide us with everything that must have rank one: if a message is in the enemy's initial knowledge, or is generable from other messages of rank one, or can be given out by a user or server process that has received only messages of rank one, then that message must itself have rank one. Otherwise, it may have rank zero without risk of causing the function to fail on any of these three conditions. The fourth condition then becomes the crucial one: do the first three statements force the messages in T to have rank one? If not, then ¼ is a rank function.
If ¼´t µ ½ for some t ¾ T, however, then we may be certain that there is no rank function; for ¼ gives a rank of one only where absolutely necessary.
Definition 3.5. We write 'S m' (read 'S leads to m') if there is a process controlling one of the users, or the server, in the CSP description of the protocol that can transmit message m having taken inputs only from the message set S. This is an inductive definition of the set X of all messages that must have a rank of one. A set X i represents the ith approximation to the set X.
If there exists a rank function, then ¼ will be a rank function. Conversely, if ¼ is not a rank function (and the only point at which it may fail is by assigning rank one to one or more members of T) then no rank function exists.
Reducing the size of the message space
This will not yet be practical for finding and verifying a rank function by hand, or even mechanically. For in order to enumerate the set X we should like it to be finite, and it is infinite on two counts: But if we can somehow reduce the set X ¼ to a finite size, and restrict the priming operation so that the sequence X ¼ X ½ X ¾ converges to a finite set, then we shall be able to construct the limit set X in a finite number of operations, and so establish in finite time whether a rank function exists. This is what we set out to achieve in the next two sections.
A convergent formulation of priming
Let us define first what we mean by the fragments of a message. (For this last case, the message should be fully expanded so that n is as large as possible; that is, so that no m t can be expressed in the form m t½ m t¾ .) We extend the definition to cover sets of messages:
Let D be the set of all messages, including the initgo and respdone messages, that could ever appear in a protocol run if no agent (including the enemy) ever behaves dishonestly. In other words, D is the set of all the messages that the designer intended ever to appear in a protocol run. Now consider the subset Å ¼ of Å that contains all fragments of all messages in D. This subset is still infinite, because we have an infinite number of atoms; but it does not have the problem of arbitrarily large concatenations and encryptions. If we could reduce the number of atoms to finite, then Å ¼ would be finite. Now we note that, since T Å ¼ , generating X Å ¼ would be sufficient to enable us to check whether ¼ is a rank function. For we are required to check whether T X , and this is now equivalent to checking whether T X Å ¼ .
But how can we enumerate this set? We write
and give the following result:
This is non-trivial: in the case of X Å ¼ , we perform all the primings and then take a finite subset; whereas in the case of Z, we restrict our attention to the finite subset after each priming. We have This completes the induction. Finally,
Proof. We show by induction that
Z i X i Å ¼ for every i.x ½ x ¾ x r a ½ a ¾ a p m ½ m ¾ mZ ½ i ¼ Z i ½ i ¼ X i Å ¼ ¡ ½ i ¼ X i Å ¼ X Å ¼
Reducing the number of agents and nonces
At this point, we apply a subtle renaming to the agents and nonces.
Agents A and B we shall keep as A and B. To those zero or more other users who are under effective control of the enemy-that is, whose secret keys and nonces are in Á AE Á Ì -we shall assign names C ¼ , C ½ , . . . . (There will usually be at least one of these, because we shall wish to allow the enemy to use his own identity on the network as an honest agent.) To the remaining zero or more users whose secret keys and nonces the enemy does not initially know, we give names D ¼ , D ½ , . . . . We rename the nonce sets accordingly: C ¿ will have nonces in We now give some further definitions and results that will enable us to reduce the size of the network much further. Definition 3.14. If a set S Å contains only entire equivalence classes-that is, whenever m ¾ S and m v then v ¾ S-then it will be said to be normal-closed.
Proposition 3.15. If S is normal-closed then whenever S m and m v we have S v.
Proof. We may think of the transition from m to N´mµ as being the result of applying a permutation on AE to the set of C-indices, and another permutation on AE to the set of D-
indices. This is also true of the transition from N´vµ to v; and since N´mµ N´vµ, we have permutations on the two index sets taking m to v. Since the generation rules and the operation of the protocol treat all users in exactly the same way, we may replace each element of S with one from the same equivalence classes by applying the same permutations to this element-so that if every occurrence of Since the proposition holds in all three cases above, we conclude that it is true for each m ¾ Å . This has far-reaching consequences. Since each Z i is normal-closed, we may represent each set by just keeping track of which equivalence classes are in the set. This gives us a finite representation of Z i : we simply store the normal forms from the equivalence classes that are included in Z i .
When we come to calculate Z i·½ from Z i , we may represent rules corresponding to S m (with S Z i ) by treating it as if it were N´Sµ N´mµ. Although it will not in general be strictly true that N´Sµ N´mµ whenever S m, the normal closure of Z i will ensure that
Completeness
It is not known whether Theorem 2.4 is complete in its most useful sense; that is, whether every protocol that is secure on an unbounded network has an associated rank function to prove its security. It remains a possibility that there are secure protocols that have no rank function.
Cervesato, Durgin, Lincoln, Mitchell and Scedrov have developed in [2] a way of specifying security protocols based on linear logic. They show, by importing standard results from linear logic and applying them to their multiset rewriting system, that correctness is an undecidable property of the class of security protocols that they can express. Further restrictions and bounds are presented by Durgin, Lincoln, Mitchell and Scedrov in [4] .
If it could be shown that security was an undecidable property of the class of protocols considered in this paper, then we would know immediately that Theorem 2.4 was incomplete; otherwise, the test for existence of a rank function presented here would be a good decision procedure for establishing security.
Their results, however, appear not to apply to the class of protocols that we have been considering. Most of their work is concerned with secrecy, rather than authentication; and, crucially, their language allows for a much larger class of protocols than ours. The computation performed by an agent in our system is restricted to decryption, encryption, equality checks and nonce generation. In [2, 4] the rules by which the agents determine which messages to send out are substantially more complicated.
Work is in progress on the completeness question.
Conclusion
The results in this paper give a clear decision procedure by which one may determine, for a given protocol, whether or not there is a rank function to prove its correctness:
1. Describe the rôles of the protocol in CSP, and find appropriate sets R and T with which to specify correctness.
2. Enumerate the equivalence classes of the set Å ¼ . If this procedure results in the conclusion that no rank function exists, because of some t ¾ T Z, then an examination of the route by which t came to be in Z will almost invariably lead to the discovery of an attack on the protocol.
Let
It makes sense to keep track, during the calculation of Z i·½ , of which messages (more accurately, which equivalence classes) were used to give which others. 
